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This paper analyzes the regional effects of EU Regional Policy during four programming periods: 1989-1993,
1994-1999, 2000-2006, 2007-2013. In particular, the focus is on the impact of transfers during the Financial and
Economic Crisis and on the effects of gaining versus losing treatment status under the main Regional Policy
subprogram – referred to as Objective 1 or Convergence Objective. We ﬁnd that effects of Objective 1 status on
growth are positive though not very long-lived: the effects of losing Objective 1 status on economic growth are
negative, and the earlier positive effects on growth in the period(s) of Objective 1 treatment more or less undone.
We show that the effects are weaker during the Crisis than before, in particular, on per-capita income in countries
where the Crisis hit harder.1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) runs a system of public transfers to sub-
national regions. The general idea of EU transfers – which are labeled
European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and European Agricultural
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) in the context of agriculture and
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund in the context of infrastructure, edu-
cation, and labor markets – is to foster structural and economic homo-
geneity across countries and regions in order to make the EU’s system of
market integration viable. As early as 1973, the British Commissioner for
Regional Policy, George Thomson, argued that regional policy is
“necessary” to help the poorer regions of Europe.
We focus on Structural and Cohesion Funds, the second-largest budget
line after the EU’s agricultural expenses. Economic research in recent
years focused on its effectiveness.1 The insights from this work were
three: expenses through the EU’s Structural and Cohesion Funds (i)
induced positive average effects on per-capita income growth in subna-
tional regions that lagged behind the EU average; (ii) more expenses did. Becker), egger@kof.ethz.ch (P.
Pellegrini et al. (2013); Cerqua a
03); Dall’erba and Le Gallo (20
2015) see Mohl and Hagen (2010
.V. This is an open access article undnot generally induce proportionately larger effects; (iii) regions responded
heterogeneously, with smaller effects found in regions where the in-
stitutions are bad (corruption is high) and where human capital is scarce.
Most of the work on the EU’s regional transfer scheme identiﬁed positive
effects on recipient-region economic growth.2
The present paper considers all programming periods 1989-93, 1994-
99, 2000-06, and 2007-13. Including the latest completed programming
period, 2007-13, goes beyond previous work and might speak to the
effectiveness of EU Regional Policy at times of the Economic and
Financial Crisis relative to “normal” times. In particular we explore
heterogeneity across transfer recipients in terms of their exposure to the
Financial and Economic Crisis. We concentrate on the effects of Objective
1 treatment (now called Convergence Objective) on a variety of outcomes
such as growth of per-capita income and employment, and total as well as
public investment intensity.
Going beyond cross-sectional identiﬁcation, we seek to estimate the
effects on economic growth and other outcomes when a region switches
into, and eventually loses, Objective 1 status – an issue which requiresH. Egger), maximilian.vonehrlich@vwi.unibe.ch (M. von Ehrlich).
nd Pellegrini (2015).
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Fig. 1. ASSIGNMENT OF OBJECTIVE 1 TREATMENT. Notes: The graph corresponds to the
pooled data for all four programming periods.
4 We do not consider non-parametric speciﬁcations of these functions for two
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which, with the exception of Barone et al. (2016), has not been stud-
ied.3 A region may lose Objective 1 status for two reasons: being just
below the 75% threshold in the previous period, it might overtake other
regions and end up above the 75% threshold. Alternatively, the
expansion of the EU into Eastern Europe pulled down the 75%
threshold in absolute terms: the same absolute level of GDP per capita
which made a region eligible beforehand, no longer satisﬁes eligibility.
The associated results may speak to the longevity – or, conversely, the
short-livedness – of the growth effects from receiving funding. A priori,
one could imagine three possible scenarios for regions which lose
Structural and Cohesion Funds recipient status: (i) the earlier funding
might have put them on a permanently higher growth trajectory; (ii) the
loss of funding status might make them return more or less rapidly to a
growth trajectory corresponding to their economic fundamentals
without funding; or (iii) they might suffer from the “sudden stop” of
losing large amounts of EU funding and face a growth of even less than
the one corresponding to their economic fundamentals without fund-
ing. Transfers associated with Objective 1 did, on average, over the
quarter of a century, 1989-2013, generate additional growth in
per-capita income among the funded regions in the EU, but less strongly
so in 2000-13 than on average. Regions that lose Objective 1 status fall
behind the average non-recipient region in terms of economic growth,
and earlier positive growth effects from such funding are more than
undone, at least in the short run. Focusing on regions that receive
Objective 1 transfers for the ﬁrst time we ﬁnd immediate positive ef-
fects which are not signiﬁcantly different from the effects observed for
the average recipient region.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines
the econometric setup. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 pre-
sents the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 provides a policy discussion
and concludes.
2. Empirical approach
We consider an approach, where the treatment is a binary Objective
1/Convergence Objective indicator for NUTS2 region i and program
period r. We will generally use Yir for economic outcomes and Xir for the
forcing variable. In particular, we need to distinguish between funding
eligibility (according to the 75% cutoff rule regarding EU average per-
capita income), Eir , and actual treatment, Dir , as there were some ex-
ceptions from the treatment rule, giving rise to a fuzzy regression-
discontinuity design (RDD). Fig. 1 shows the corresponding disconti-
nuity in the treatment probability for the pooled sample across all pre-
budgetary-period years in the data. We estimate the fuzzy RDD in a
two-stage least-squares approach where the ﬁrst- and second-stage
regression equations, respectively, are given by:
Dir ¼ h0ðXirÞ þ Eir½γ1 þ h1ðXirÞ  h0ðXirÞ þ ζir þ νir; (1)
Yir ¼ f0ðXirÞ þ Dir ½α1 þ f1ðXirÞ  f0ðXirÞ þ ηir þ εir ; (2)
with α1 measuring the local average treatment effect (LATE) of binary
Objective 1 transfer treatment. Akin to h1ðXirÞ and h0ðXirÞ in the ﬁrst
stage, f1ðXirÞ and f0ðXirÞ are ﬂexible, smooth (differentiable) functions of
pre-budgetary-period normalized log-per-capita income in purchasing
power parity. The functions h1 (f1) and h0 (f0) are separately estimated3 Barone et al. (2016) study the case of one Italian region (Abruzzi) that lost
its funding status de jure at the end of 1999 and de facto at the end of 2000.
They use a synthetic control method (i.e., they generate an artiﬁcial Abruzzi
region by weighting other Italian regions). In contrast, our approach focuses on
the loss of Objective 1 status at large, considering all EU regions, and it is based
on a regression discontinuity design, which identiﬁes the treatment effect from a
subsample of EU regions in the vicinity of the 75% of EU average per-capita
income threshold.
144for the eligible (treated) and non-eligible (non-treated) observations,
respectively, and include linear and quadratic terms of normalized per-
capita GDP.4 The terms ζir and ηir reﬂect row vectors of effects,
including ﬁxed country and time effects and, in some of the analysis, the
impact of country-level government-bond-yield spreads as measures of
the Financial and Economic Crisis.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
We downloaded data on most variables from Eurostat Regional Sta-
tistics. We complement this by data from Cambridge Econometrics. The
information about Objective 1 status and eligibility as well as informa-
tion on expenditures stem from the European Commission. See Table A1
for details about the data sources.
Treatment variable The binary Objective 1 treatment indicator
variable, Dir , is determined on the basis of NUTS2 real per-capita levels in
speciﬁc years prior to each programming period.5 Given non-compliance,
we need to distinguish between eligible and recipient NUTS2 regions. Two
important reasons for non-compliance are: (i) regions that did not qualify
for Objective 1 status based on the data available at the time when
regional funds were assigned, turned out to be eligible ex post (or vice
versa), when GDP ﬁgures were revised; (ii) speciﬁc exceptions were
granted to regions with a low population density and in peripheral
locations.6
Outcome variables We consider the following outcomes: average
annual PPP-adjusted GDP-per-capita growth; average annual employ-
ment growth; average annual total investment intensity (gross ﬁxed
capital formation relative to GDP); and average annual public investment
intensity (gross ﬁxed capital formation of the public sector relative to
GDP).
Control variables In some of the regressions we control for ﬁxedreasons: ﬁrst, we focus on switchers with respect to Objective 1 status and the
mass of switchers is not large enough to support non-parametric estimation;
second, there is no existing procedure to determine the optimal bandwidth for
non-parametric RDD with panel data and ﬁxed effects.
5 These years were 1983-85, 1988-90, 1994-96 (1997-99 for new members),
2000-2002 for the four programming periods considered here. See the EU
Council Regulations 2052/88, 2082/93, 502/1999, 595/2006, and 189/2007,
for further details.
6 Examples for such NUTS2 recipient regions are ones in northern Sweden and
eastern Austria.
Table 1
Eligibility and actual treatment under Objective 1 according to 75% GDP per
capita threshold.
1989-2013 Objective 1 treatment
Eligible for Objective 1 0 1 Total
0 609 37 646
1 14 242 256
Total 623 279 902
1989-1993
0 131 9 140
1 4 43 47
Total 135 52 187
1994-1999
0 148 14 162
1 3 44 47
Total 151 58 209
2000-2006
0 149 12 161
1 5 87 92
Total 154 99 253
2007-2013
0 181 2 183
1 2 68 70
Total 183 70 253
Notes: For the ﬁrst and second programming periods our samples base on the
NUTS2 classiﬁcation from 2003. This yields 187 EU12 NUTS2 regions in 1989-
1993 and 209 EU15 NUTS2 regions in 1994-1999. In the last two programming
periods our sample bases on the 2006 classiﬁcation which yields 253 EU25
NUTS2 regions in 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. Phasing-out regions are treated as
non-Objective 1 regions. Results are robust to deﬁning phasing-out regions are
treated as Objective 1 regions.
Fig. 2. DENSITY CHECK TO DETECT POTENTIAL MANIPULATION OF GDP PER CAPITA. Notes: The
graph shows a density plot of GDP per capita in the years determining eligibility
for Objective 1 status. Data are pooled over all four programming periods.
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effects of government-bond-yield spreads (GBYS) with ten years of
maturity which vary across countries and years. The latter were collected
from the European Central Bank (ECB) and the OECD.7
Sample composition We do not include Bulgaria, Romania, and
Croatia in the analysis for reasons of data availability. In order to
harmonize the data, we use Eurostat’s correspondence tables and assign
all observations in the periods 1989-93, 1994-99 according to the NUTS
classiﬁcation from 2003 and those in the periods 1994-99, and 2000-06
according to the NUTS classiﬁcation from 2006.8 The number of NUTS2
regions available after harmonizing data on economic outcomes from
Cambridge Econometrics and the European Commission’s Structural
Funds is 187 in 1989-93, 209 in 1994-99, 253 in 2000-06, and 253 in
2007-13.
Descriptive statistics for variables at the NUTS2 level Table 1
shows eligibility for Objective 1 funding (dubbed Eir in Section 2) and
actual treatment (Dir). While Panel A pools regions over all programming
periods so that the numbers refer to region-period observations (one
observation representing one NUTS2 region in a single programming
period), Panels B-E present the programming-period-speciﬁc numbers.
We brieﬂy discuss the numbers in Panel A. Altogether, of 902 NUTS2-
region-by-period observations covered, 343 were eligible for Objective
1 treatment, while 279 actually got funding. Cases where eligible regions
did not get Objective 1 treatment are rare (14 out of 256 observations),
but treatment in absence of a formal eligibility in terms of the initial-7 We calculate the GBYS as follows. For most countries, we take the difference
between the harmonized long-term interest rates on government bonds and the
short-term rates of the ECB (ﬁxed-rate tenders within the main reﬁnancing
operations) which are provided on-line by the ECB (www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/
html/index.en.html). Where these data are not available, we take the difference
between the long-term interest rates on government bonds and the short-term
interest rates of that country provided by the OECD (using the Monetary and
Financial Statistics Database).
8 See data appendix for details.
145period per-capita-income rule are not as infrequent (37 out of 646
cases). Objective 1 treatment eligibility generally guaranteed actual
treatment unless national governments did not provide data on per-
capita incomes at the appropriate regional level. Objective 1 treatment
for ineligible regions roots in a number of exceptions that were formu-
lated in the respective budgets (see Section 3 for examples).
Table A2 shows summary statistics for key variables of interest,
pooled over the four programming periods 1989-93, 1994-99, 2000-06,
and 2007-13: GDP per capita growth is measured as the average annual
difference of the logarithms of end-of-period and prior-to-period GDP
per capita. The prior-to-period years are 1988 for 1989-93, 1993 for
1994-99, 1999 for 2000-06, and 2006 for 2007-13.9 Employment growth
is also deﬁned in terms of logarithms and for the same years, while
(total) Investment per GDP and Public investment per GDP are average
ratios observed across all years during a programming period. Hence,
with GDP per capita growth, an average of 0.03 indicates an average
annual growth rate of about 3 percent during a programming period.
With, e.g., Investment per GDP, an average of 0.23 indicates an average
annual investment rate of 23 percent of GDP during a programming
period. The means of 0.31 for actual treatment (Dir) and of 0.28 for
treatment eligibility (Eir) are consistent with the numbers in Table 1.
The ﬁnal row displays per-capita GDP in purchasing-power parity terms
as a deviation from the respective EU average: negative numbers
indicate normalized values of by-rule eligible NUTS2 regions, while
positive numbers indicate normalized values of by-rule ineligible
NUTS2 regions.
Validity of the RDD setup Fig. 2 shows the density distribution of
GDP per capita relative to the 75% threshold when pooling observations
across all four programming periods. This ﬁgure following McCrary
(2008) does not indicate any manipulation of GDP per capita in order to
gain eligibility for Objective 1 funds, as would be suggested by a spike in
the number of regions just below the 75% threshold. In particular, we
obtain an estimate of 0:02 for the discontinuity of the density function at
the threshold and a relatively large standard error of 0:11.
A further test for the validity of the RDD setup is to check whether not
only the treatment (as illustrated in Fig. 1) but also covariates displayed a
discontinuity at the threshold. We graphically document a lack of9 The prior-to-period years in the table should not be confused with the set of
years prior to each programming period which served to determine Objective 1-
treatment eligibility based on average real per-capita-income levels.
Table 2
Effects of objective 1 treatment–1989–2013.
Linear 2nd. order polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per capita growth
Objective 1 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Fixed effects no yes no yes
Observations 901 901 901 901
No. regions 259 259 259 259
F ﬁrst-stage 689.104 140.088 477.942 133.942
AIC 5182.407 5463.379 5194.106 5464.468
Employment growth
Objective 1 0.005** 0.005 0.008*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Fixed effects no yes no yes
Observations 901 901 901 901
No. regions 259 259 259 259
F ﬁrst-stage 689.104 140.088 477.942 133.942
AIC 5208.505 5566.503 5202.542 5607.387
Investment per GDP
Objective 1 0.043*** 0.002 0.033*** 0.002
(0.009) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017)
Fixed effects no yes no yes
Observations 901 901 901 901
No. regions 259 259 259 259
F ﬁrst-stage 689.104 140.088 477.942 133.942
AIC 2736.250 3615.999 2740.356 3614.497
Public investment per GDP
Objective 1 0.036*** 0.030 0.038*** 0.039*
(0.006) (0.021) (0.007) (0.022)
Fixed effects no yes no yes
Observations 807 802 807 802
No. regions 254 254 254 254
F ﬁrst-stage 508.083 50.947 328.900 45.460
AIC 3547.812 3870.893 3544.216 3856.188
Notes: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
All estimates base on a two-stage least square approach using eligibility as the
instrument, controlling for the forcing variable and its interactions, and time
ﬁxed effects. Speciﬁcations without NUTS2 ﬁxed effects include country ﬁxed
effects. Growth rates refer to log differences divided by the number of years.
Investment rates refer to the sum of investments divided by the sum of GDP over
the respective programming period. Lower AIC indicates better model-ﬁt. For
details about the data sources see Table A1.
11 When running the same regressions as in Table 3 for the NUTS2 regions of
S.O. Becker et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics 69 (2018) 143–152discontinuity for a number of candidate covariates (employment share in
services; employment share in manufacturing; population per square
kilometer; employment measured at the employment location over active
population measured at the residence location) for the sample at hand in
Fig. A1 in the Appendix. All of these variables could be thought of as
determinants of economic growth.10
These tests together suggest that (a) there is no manipulation of GDP
per capita to obtain eligibility and (b) there is no jump in any of the
covariates at the 75% threshold, so the only jump of interest is the one in
treatment status and subsequently in the outcomes of interest.
4. Local average effects of binary Objective 1 treatment
Period 1989-2013 Table 2 summarizes results based on the
approach in Section 2 and the pooled data for 1989-2013 in Section 3.
Column (1) pertains to a linear speciﬁcation in terms of the forcing
variable, Xir . Column (2) is the same as Column (1) except that NUTS2
ﬁxed effects across programming periods are included. With dense-
enough data – i.e., with sufﬁciently many observations in the10 Similar evidence for continuity of covariates in the ﬁrst three periods
1989–2006 is documented in Fig. 4 of Becker et al. (2010).
146neighborhood of Xir ¼ 0 – including such ﬁxed effects (or any other
control variable) would not be necessary as observations on both sides
of the thresholds are quasi identical. However, given the limited
number of NUTS2 regions at hand, it may be that unobserved factors
still vary across eligible and non-eligible regions and thus controlling
for ﬁxed NUTS2 effects might be desirable. Columns (3) and (4)
correspond to Columns (1) and (2), respectively, except that they use
linear as well as quadratic terms of Xir .
The parameters in Panel A of Table 2 are relatively stable across
the four columns of interest, and they vary between 0.012 in Column
(3) and 0.019 in Columns (2) and (4). These ﬁndings support an in-
crease in period-speciﬁc per-capita-income growth by somewhat less
than 2 percentage points due to Objective 1 treatment. These results
are quantitatively close to the ﬁndings in Becker et al. (2010) for only
three programming periods. The fact that including versus excluding
the region-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects is of little bearing for the statistical
(and economic) signiﬁcance of the results suggests that omitted vari-
ables are of minor importance, and the RDD is quite successful in
isolating the causal effect of Objective 1 treatment on per-capita in-
come growth.
This is much less the case for Employment growth and (total) Investment
per GDP (i.e., investment intensity) in Panels B and C, respectively. There,
we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant effects on employment growth (negative)
and investment intensity (positive) only when not controlling for region-
speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, whereas the impact of Objective 1 treatment is
statistically insigniﬁcant when accounting for those effects. This suggests
that Objective 1 treatment and/or the forcing variable is correlated with
time-invariant determinants of employment growth and investment in-
tensity (this is different from the determinants of and results for per-
capita income growth). With regard to Public investment per GDP we
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and robust effect of about 2.2 percentage points. Hence,
we should be more cautious in interpreting the effects on employment
and private investment relative to the ones on per-capita-income growth
or on public investment intensity. Moreover, the results suggest that the
increased accumulation of public capital stock crowds out some private
investments.
Period 2000-13 and the Financial and Economic Crisis Table 3
repeats the analysis of Table 2 for only the last two programming pe-
riods. This serves two purposes: ﬁrst, it allows us to understand whether
effects of Objective 1 transfers are stable over time; second, it provides
estimates for the role of Objective 1 transfers for regions in more versus
less crisis-stricken countries. The table is organized in six columns. The
results in Columns (1)-(3) are based on linear functions of the forcing
variable, Xir , while Columns (4)–(6) are based on quadratic functions of
it. Columns (2) and (5) include NUTS2-region and time ﬁxed effects,
whereas the other columns only include country and time ﬁxed effects.
Columns (3) and (6) account for the average treatment effect as a
parameter on the Objective 1 indicator, on the main effect of the
Financial and Economic Crisis through the government-bond-yield
spreads (GBYS) variable, and an interaction term of the former with
the demeaned GBYS. The coefﬁcient on the latter may inform us about
the heterogeneity of the LATE of Objective 1 treatment in terms of the
country-level GBYS.11
The ﬁndings for the main effect of Objective 1 transfers in the periods
2000-06 and 2007–13 in Columns (1)–(2) and (4)–(5) are somewhat
different from the ones for the pooled period in 1989–2013: (a) GDP
growth effects are smaller than for 1989–2013; (b) interestingly, there is
a positive effect on employment growth in that subperiod; (c) there is noEU15 countries only in the programming periods spanning 2000-13 in Table A3,
we ﬁnd very similar effects as in Table 3. Hence, the difference in the results
between the last two programming periods and the earlier ones in 1989-99 (or
the pooled sample for 1989–2013) should not be attributed to the difference in
the sample composition.
Table 3
Effects of objective 1 treatment during the Crisis – 2000–2013 .
Linear 2nd. Order polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita growth
Objective 1 0.006*** 0.012* 0.015** 0.005* 0.012** 0.014**
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
Objective 1GBYS 0.004*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.002)
GBYS 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
NUTS2 ﬁxed effects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 506 506 428 506 506 428
No. regions 253 253 253 253 253 253
AIC 3022.157 3271.642 2970.299 3028.902 3344.430 2984.258
Employment growth
Objective 1 0.006** 0.019*** 0.015* 0.003 0.017*** 0.012
(0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008)
Objective 1GBYS 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
GBYS 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
NUTS2 ﬁxed effects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 506 506 428 506 506 428
No. regions 253 253 253 253 253 253
AIC 3047.726 3323.749 2885.460 3055.183 3351.848 2917.826
Investment per GDP
Objective 1 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.008 0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015)
Objective 1GBYS 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
GBYS 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
NUTS2 ﬁxed effects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 506 506 428 506 506 428
No. regions 253 253 253 253 253 253
AIC 1758.079 2846.211 2349.714 1757.593 2846.036 2351.288
Public investment per GDP
Objective 1 0.016*** 0.002 0.006* 0.016*** 0.002 0.006**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Objective 1GBYS 0.002** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
GBYS 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
NUTS2 ﬁxed effects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 274 250 174 274 250 174
No. regions 149 149 149 149 149 149
AIC 1694.864 2028.886 1511.265 1694.588 2029.357 1526.619
Notes: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. All estimates base on a two-stage least square approach using eligibility as the in-
strument, controlling for the forcing variable and its interactions, and time ﬁxed effects. Speciﬁcations without NUTS2 ﬁxed effects include country ﬁxed effects. The
exposure to the Financial and Economic Crisis, is measured by government-bond-yields spreads (GBYS). Government-bond-yields spreads are denoted in percent. We
use data for 2005, 2006 in the ﬁrst period and 2009–2012 in the second period. Lower AIC indicates better model-ﬁt. For details about the data sources see Table A1.
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Table 4
NUTS2 Regions no longer in objective 1 status.
No longer Obj.1 in 2000–2006 No longer Obj.1 in 2007-2013
but in 1994-1999 but in 2000–2006
NUTS2
code
Name NUTS2
code
Name
BE32 Prov. Hainaut AT11 Burgenland (AT)
DE30 Berlin DE42 Brandenburg - Südwest
ES13 Cantabria DED3 Leipzig
FR83 Corse ES12 Principado de Asturias
IE02 Southern and
Eastern
ES41 Castilla y Leon
ITF1 Abruzzo ES52 Comunidad Valenciana
ITF2 Molise ES62 Region de Murcia
NL23 Flevoland ES63 Ciudad Autonoma de Ceuta
PT17 Lisboa ES64 Ciudad Autonoma de Melilla
UKM6 Highlands and
Islands
ES70 Canarias
UKN0 Northern Ireland FI13 It€a-Suomi
FI19 L€ansi-Suomi
FI1A Pohjois-Suomi
GR12 Kentriki Makedonia
GR13 Dytiki Makedonia
GR24 Sterea Ellada
GR30 Attiki
GR42 Notio Aigaio
HU10 K€ozep-Magyarorszag
IE01 Border, Midland and
Western
ITF5 Basilicata
ITG2 Sardegna
PT15 Algarve
PT30 Regi~ao Autonoma da
Madeira
SE31 Norra Mellansverige
SE32 Mellersta Norrland
SE33 €Ovre Norrland
UKD5 Merseyside
UKE3 South Yorkshire
Notes: The majority of these regions received phasing-out support in the pro-
gramming period after loosing Objective 1 support. All regions that received
Objective 1 support in the period 1989-1993 received Objective 1 support in the
period 1994-1999, too.
Table 5
Effects of entering and losing Objective 1 treatment – 1989–2013 .
Entering Objective 1 Losing Objective 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per capita growth
Change status 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.017** 0.017*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 515 515 167 167
No. regions 193 193 68 68
AIC 3038.959 3168.091 821.291 824.415
Employment growth
Change status 0.007** 0.006* 0.006 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 515 515 167 167
No. regions 193 193 68 68
AIC 3529.970 3564.679 1018.382 1018.788
Investment per GDP
Change status 0.005 0.000 0.033*** 0.018
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 515 515 167 167
No. regions 193 193 68 68
AIC 2621.725 2626.276 699.220 712.098
Public investment per GDP
Change status –0.005 –0.001 0.005 0.000
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 456 456 136 136
No. regions 190 190 62 62
AIC 2402.075 2404.599 834.805 844.144
Notes: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
All estimates base on a ﬁxed effect speciﬁcation controlling for the forcing var-
iable and its interactions. We use only regions that comply with the eligibility
rule and accordingly estimate a sharp RDD. Growth rates refer to log differences
divided by the number of years. Change status is a dummy either indicating ob-
servations that received Objective 1 transfers for the ﬁrst time (columns (1) and
(2)) or observations that received Objective 1 transfers in the previous period and
lost this status (columns (3) and (4)). In total 95 observations switched Objective
1 status (55 gained and 40 lost Objective status) in the programming periods
considered. All Entering Objective 1 speciﬁcations are restricted to observations
that never received Objective 1 transfers or received them for the ﬁrst time.
Speciﬁcations for Losing Objective 1 are restricted to observations that always
received Objective 1 transfers or lost them in the previous period. Columns (1)
and (3) include linear terms of the forcing variable; columns (2) and (3) include
quadratic terms of the forcing variable. Since we identify from changes in status,
all speciﬁcations are restricted to three out of four periods because we have no
data prior to 1989-1993. Lower AIC indicates better model-ﬁt.
12 Using data on allocations to NUTS2 regions and effective expenditure paid
out to NUTS2 regions, we can compute an absorption rate for aggregate EU
transfers and correlate this ratio with GBYS. It turns out that regions with a
higher crisis exposure also had a lower absorption rate during 2007-13, as is
indicated by a correlation coefﬁcient of 0:504 between the two measures.
13 As mentioned in the introduction, Barone et al. (2016) study the case of one
speciﬁc Italian region, Abruzzi, after losing its transfer status.
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gramming periods; and (d) there is no longer an effect on the public in-
vestment intensity. A lower level of GBYS reﬂects a greater degree of
sustainability of public ﬁnances in a country. Accordingly, countries that
were hit harder by the European Crisis are characterized by a relatively
sharp increase in GBYS after 2008. The results in Columns (3) and (6) of
Table 2 suggest that the Crisis induced negative effects on per-capita-
income and employment growth of similar magnitude. However, a
greater exposure to the Crisis (reﬂected in a bigger increase in GBYS)
resulted in a lower Objective 1-treatment effect on per-capita-income
growth and a higher Objective 1-treatment effect on employment
growth than on average. Hence, Objective 1 treatment was less successful
to shield regions of adverse effects in terms of per-capita-income growth
than of ones in terms of employment. The results suggest that an increase
in GBYS by about one-and-a-half standard deviations fully cancels the
positive average treatment effect of Objective 1 transfers (the standard
deviation of GBYS in the data is 1:89). Such an increase was experienced
in Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal,
and in the Slovak Republic during 2007-13. One explanation for this
result is the requirement for local co-ﬁnancing to receive transfers. The
EU recognized this issue and reduced co-ﬁnancing rates during the crisis
(see EU Council Regulation 18512/11), but this adjustment apparently
came late and was not sufﬁcient to accommodate the needs to cushion
the detrimental effects of the Crisis on the effects of Objective 1 transfers148on real income growth.12
Entering and Losing Objective 1 status: 1989-2013 With the four
programming periods at hand, we may for the ﬁrst time study how re-
gions developed after having lost their Objective 1 status in the EU as a
whole.13 Table 4 lists the regions that dropped out of the Objective 1
program in the periods 2000-06 and 2007-13 (note that all regions that
had received Objective 1 support in 1989-93 did remain in the program
also during 1994–1999). Different from the fuzzy RDD in Eqs. (1)–(2),
this model excludes observations which continually receive Objective 1
treatment when exploring the effects of Entering Objective 1 and it ex-
cludes observations which never received Objective 1 treatment when
exploring the effects of Losing Objective 1. Again we control for
Table 6
Income inequality across EU15 NUTS2 regions: 1989-2013.
1989 1994 2000 2007
Coefﬁcient of variation (CV) 2232.558 2724.720 3510.096 4682.964
Range/mean 5.277 5.270 4.930 5.471
Notes: We use per-capita GDP (PPP) in EU NUTS2 regions to compute the coef-
ﬁcient of variation (CV) and the ratio of the distribution’s range and mean. These
measures are compared for the ﬁrst years of the four budgetary periods under
consideration.
Table A1
Data sources.
Variable Source
Objective 1 status Ofﬁcial Journal of the European
Communities
1989-93 Number L 374, Volume 31, 31.12.1988
1994-99 Number L 193, Volume 36, 31.7.1993
2000-06 Number L 194, Volume 53, 27.7.1999
2007-13 Number L 243, Volume 44, 6.9.2006
GDP per capita Eurostat&Cambridge Econometrics 2015
Employment (by sectors) Cambridge Econometrics 2015
Gross value added (by sectors) Cambridge Econometrics 2015
Population Eurostat
Active population Cambridge Econometrics 2015
Total investment Eurostat
Public investment Eurostat
Government-bond-yield spreads
(GBYS)
European Central Bank&OECD
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quadratic models with GDP per capita growth, employment growth, in-
vestment per GDP, and public investment per GDP as alternative out-
comes. We generally include NUTS2 ﬁxed effects in these speciﬁcations
such that the effects are identiﬁed from units that changed Objective 1
status. Table 5 reports the corresponding results where Columns (1) and
(2) show the effects of Entering Objective 1 and Columns (3) and (4) the
ones of Losing Objective 1. The former is to be interpreted as the gains of a
newly treated region compared to those that never receive Objective 1
transfers. Analogously, the effect of Losing Objective 1 reﬂects the
reduction in economic activity when losing transfers compared to a
counterfactual where transfers continue to be received. Note that there
are several types of regions: non-Objective 1 regions which mostly
receive a low but positive treatment intensity (via Objective 2 and 3),Fig. A1. CONTINUITY OF COVARIATES. Notes: The graph shows depicts local averages as
149regions that were assigned phasing-out Objective 1 status and regions
that were assigned Objective 1 status in spite of not being eligible ac-
cording to the 75% threshold rule, and regions that were assigned
Objective 1 status according to the rule. Notably the latter category re-
ceives about 2-3 times higher transfers (in the budgeting periods
2000–06 and 2007–13) than the regions that were assigned Objective 1well as a local polynomial ﬁts for the covariates against the forcing variable.
Table A2
Descriptive statistics NUTS2 – 1989–2013.
Mean StdDev Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per capita growth .03 .02 .06 .13
Employment growth .006 .02 .08 .07
Total investment per GDP .23 .06 .11 .62
Public investment per GDP .05 .04 0.01 .46
Objective 1 .31 .46 .00 1.00
Eligible for Objective 1 .28 .45 .00 1.00
GDP per capita minus 75% of EU
average
2790.60 5479.27 8851.53 40895.61
Table A3
Effects of objective 1 treatment in EU15 regions during the Crisis – 2000-2013.
Linear
(1) (2) (3)
GDP per capita growth
Objective 1 0.004 0.015*** 0.01
(0.002) (0.005) (0.0
Objective 1 GBYS 0.
(0.0
GBYS 0.
(0.0
NUTS2 ﬁxed effects no yes yes
Observations 422 422 348
No. regions 211 211 211
AIC 2604.847 2809.102 25
Employment growth
Objective 1 0.002 0.020*** 0.01
(0.002) (0.006) (0.0
Objective 1  GBYS 0.00
(0.0
GBYS 0.
(0.0
NUTS2 ﬁxed effects no yes yes
Observations 422 422 348
No. regions 211 211 211
AIC 2582.447 2779.992 23
Investment per GDP
Objective 1 0.006 0.003 0.00
(0.009) (0.008) (0.0
Objective 1GBYS 0.
(0.0
GBYS 0.
(0.0
NUTS2 ﬁxed effects no yes yes
Observations 422 422 348
No. regions 211 211 211
AIC 1467.031 2470.157 19
Public investment per GDP
Objective 1 0.021*** 0.009** 0.37
(0.004) (0.004) (1.0
Objective 1 Crisis 0.63
(1.7
GBYS 0.00
(0.0
NUTS2 ﬁxed effects no yes yes
Observations 194 170 96
No. regions 109 109 109
AIC 1166.472 1384.826 75
Notes: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. A
strument, controlling for the forcing variable and its interactions, and time ﬁxed effec
exposure to the Financial and Economic Crisis, is measured by government-bond-yiel
use data for 2005, 2006 in the ﬁrst period and 2009-2012 in the second period. Lowe
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150due to some exceptions. As we aim to study the effects of switching from
strict Objective 1 status to the non-eligible status and vice versa, we
restrict the sample in the following to the units which complied with the
treatment rule.
Compared to regions that neither received Objective 1 transfers in t
nor in t 1, those that entered into the program in period t but did not
receive transfers in t  1 grew 2.1 to 2.6 percentage points more than
never-treated comparison regions. In contrast, regions that dropped out
of Objective 1 status in t and accordingly lost substantial transfers
compared to t  1 grew 1.7 percentage points less than the always-treated
comparison regions. These estimates are very stable across speciﬁcations
and highly signiﬁcant. With regard to employment growth we observe a2nd. Order polynomial
(4) (5) (6)
6*** 0.003 0.012** 0.015***
06) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
003*** 0.004***
01) (0.001)
004*** 0.004***
01) (0.001)
no yes yes
422 422 348
211 211 211
63.986 2607.398 2867.684 2576.552
4* 0.000 0.016*** 0.010
07) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
1 0.001
01) (0.002)
005*** 0.005***
01) (0.001)
no yes yes
422 422 348
211 211 211
64.746 2586.054 2826.028 2402.833
4 0.000 0.002 0.002
13) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013)
001 0.000
03) (0.003)
001 0.001
02) (0.002)
no yes yes
422 422 348
211 211 211
85.164 1464.496 2470.182 1985.679
5 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.108
34) (0.005) (0.004) (0.184)
1 0.190
48) (0.320)
3 0.000
12) (0.003)
no yes yes
194 170 96
109 109 109
9.391 1171.652 1389.450 894.495
ll estimates base on a two-stage least square approach using eligibility as the in-
ts. Speciﬁcations without NUTS2 ﬁxed effects include country ﬁxed effects. The
ds spreads (GBYS). Government-bond-yields spreads are denoted in percent. We
r AIC indicates better model-ﬁt. For details about the data sources see Table A1.
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status is not related to signiﬁcant immediate reductions in employment
growth. Considering the immediate drop in income and the slow
response of labor markets this seems plausible. For investments, we do
not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effects.
These ﬁndings suggest that the positive contemporaneous responses
to transfers are not permanent and seem to vanish when transfers are
stopped. While there is a signiﬁcant and sizable contemporaneous effect
of Objective 1 transfers this may be largely due to consumption effects
and it remains questionable, whether self-sustaining growth is triggered
by the transfers, at least by their recipience over less than two decades.
The evidence suggests that the contemporaneous beneﬁts of transfers are
undone after losing Objective 1 status. This ﬁnding is very much in line
with Barone et al. (2016) who ﬁnd the same result in their study of the
Italian Abruzzi region. Our result that Objective 1 treatment effects are
not long-lasting is in line with the overall pattern of GDP per capita (PPP)
disparities across EU15 NUTS2 regions measured in terms of the coefﬁ-
cient of variation (CV) and the ratio of the distribution’s range and the
mean (Range/mean) as summarized in Table 6. While it is impossible to
isolate the causal role of transfers regarding this descriptive evidence, it
nevertheless indicates that overall economic disparities among the EU15
NUTS2 regions did not decline such that transfers were at least not
capable of compensating any other trends that contributed to increasing
disparities among the respective regions over a relatively large time
window.
5. Discussion and conclusions
After agricultural assistance, the European Union’s Regional Policy is
the second-biggest line in the Union’s budget. At times of tighter budgets
due to stagnation if not economic downturn, voters and politicians in net-
contributing (to the EU budget) countries and regions ask about the
justiﬁcation of such budgets, even more so than at times of economic
prosperity.
This paper sheds light on the effects of the Structural Funds in
recipient regions. It illustrates that the programme induced positive ef-
fects not only over all periods for which data exist in the past but also in
the two most recent completed budgetary periods (2000–06 and 2007-
13) which were affected adversely by cyclical phenomena. The effects of
transfers in the Crisis period were weaker than before, in particular, on
per-capita income in countries where the Crisis hit harder. Adjustments
with regard to co-ﬁnancing were successful in strengthening the treat-
ment effect of Objective 1 or Convergence Objective transfers on employ-
ment growth but not on income growth in particularly Crisis-prone
regions. Another insight is that transfers tend to display immediate ef-
fects, but they do not show much longevity beyond a programming
period when it comes to stimulating real per-capita-income growth in
recipient regions. Hence, previous growth gains seem to be largely un-
done once Objective 1 status is lost. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
idea that Objective 1 status – when awarded at all – should probably be
kept for longer periods and should be geared towards investments that
support long-term growth prospects. Otherwise, some regions might just
see a one-off bonanza without any long-term beneﬁts.
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Appendix
NUTS regions
Eurostat, the statistical agency of the European Union, operates a
regional classiﬁcation scheme of ﬁve levels for all regional units within
the EU, the Nomenclature des Unites Territoriales Statistiques (NUTS).
The highest level of regional aggregation (NUTS1) corresponds to Ger-
many’s Bundesl€ander, France’s Zones d’Etudes et d’Amenagement du
Territoire, the United Kingdom’s Regions of England/Scotland/Wales,
Spain’s Grupos de Comunidades Autonomas, Italy’s Gruppi di Regioni
Nord-Est/Nord-Ovest/Centro/Sud/Isole, or Austria’s clusters of Bun-
desl€ander, namely, West€osterreich/Süd€osterreich/Ost€osterreich. At the
other end of the NUTS classiﬁcation scheme, NUTS5 regions correspond
to municipalities. From an institutional point of view, two subnational
aggregates are particularly important for EU Regional Policy, namely
NUTS2 and NUTS3. The following types of regions correspond to NUTS2:
Regierungsbezirke (Germany), Regions (France), Groups of Metropolitan
Counties or Shire Counties (United Kingdom), Comunidades y Ciudades
Autonomas (Spain), Regioni (Italy), or Bundesl€ander (Austria). The
following types of regions correspond to NUTS3: Landkreise (Germany),
Departements (France), Unitary Authorities (United Kingdom), Provin-
cias y Islas y Ceuta y Melilla (Spain), Provincie (Italy), and Gruppen von
Politischen Bezirken (Austria). The NUTS2 and NUTS3 aggregates are
important, since the allocation of funding is determined at those levels
(e.g., eligibility under the Objective 1 line is determined at the NUTS2
level, and actual funding at other levels and reporting thereof to the EU is
determined at the NUTS3 level).
Note that the regional aggregation –NUTS –was adjusted on a regular
basis (i.e. in the years 1995, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2010, and 2013) and data
is not available for all outcomes and all years according to a homoge-
neous classiﬁcation. We use the 2003 classiﬁcation for the ﬁrst two pe-
riods as many units cannot be uniquely assigned the classiﬁcation from
2006.
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